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1. Introduction Ǯǡǡ
affairs as it sees fit. This extends to security and criminal justice. However much 
the proper organisation of justice, rights and security is determined by standards 
valid independentǯ, a 
community has a right to settle its own best collective understanding of these 
matters, and to set its own priorities as to how they should be respected and 
pursued. In the case of serious abuse or disorganisation, a community may lose 
the right to determine these things for itself, and external intervention may be 
necessary. But a reasonably well-functioning political community should be free Ǥǯ 
 
This is a statement Ȃ bland, perhaps Ȃ of a reasonably uncontroversial position in 
political philosophy. Some will argue even with this, of course. But many will find 
appealing the idea that there is some sort of sovereignty possessed by a group of 
people working together to set the conditions of its collective existence Ȃ that 
that collective effort is inherently of value and deserves space to succeed, even if 
that means making its own mistakes Ȃ though there are of course various ways 
of explaining why this should be the case.1  
 
There is plenty to say about this statement, but in this paper I want to focus on 
two related aspects of it. One is that it is compatible with the view it puts 
forward that a political community would be within its rights, if it decided 
democratically so to do, to implement policies of mass imprisonment such as we 
have witnessed over the past fifty years in the US and to a lesser degree in the 
UK.2 The other is that it is compatible with this view of democracy that a political 
community could delegate the determination and execution of criminal justice 
policy to a technical association that would carry those tasks out on its behalf; 
the association would carry out its task only on the condition that it had been 
given the right to do so by the political community, so there is no threat to 
sovereignty in this conferral of rights. 
                                                        
1 For a selection of justifications, see e.g. the remarks on democracy in J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 195-201ǢǤǡǮǡǯJournal of Political Philosophy vol. 12 (2004); ǤǡǮǡǯYale Law Journal vol. 115 (2006); D. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A 
Philosophical Framework (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
2 	ǡǤǡǮ-Determination and the Disenfranchisement of 	ǡǯJournal of Applied Philosophy Ǥ ? ?ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǢǤǡǮOn Following Orders in an ǡǯJournal of Political Philosophy vol. 15 (2007). 
 The crucial thing about the view of democracy expressed in this opening 
statement is that it is framed entirely in terms of the rights a community has by 
virtue of its democratic status. It looks at these rights as what the Hegelians call 
abstract, arbitrary rights Ȃ liberty rights to do one thing or another, as the 
possessor of the right sees fit. It says nothing about the substance of democracy, 
or the obligations that might come with democratic arrangements.3  
 
Contrary to the limited conception of democracy presented in the opening 
statement, in this paper I am particularly interested in the idea that democracy 
means that citizens have an obligation to govern themselves Ȃ in particular, an 
obligation to get involved and help to run central institutions of their political 
community such as the criminal justice system, rather than to allow these 
institutions to be run by some sort of technical association, however expert in its 
subject-matter. I will be asking what the nature and ground of these obligations 
could be, and how central they are to the theory of democracy. This foundational 
question is pursued in the service of a more urgent practical question: whether 
there is something more substantial that theorists of democracy should say 
specifically Ǯǯ canvassed above. I will be 
looking in particular at the arguments put forward by Albert Dzur in favour of 
greater citizen participation in criminal justice. I am sympathetic to these ǡǯǡ
where I sense they need some further explanation. In that way I hope that we can 
better understand the participatory democratic position, its strengths and how 
to address its weaknesses. 
 
2. Democracy as a solution to the problem of mass imprisonment? 
According to a commonly heard narrative, the US, and to some extent the UK 
following it, has become increasingly punitive over the past 50 years Ȃ evidence 
for which might include significant increases in rates of imprisonment, lengths of 
sentencesǡǮǯǡǯ
harsh sentences based on previous convictions Ȃ and a key reason cited for these ǮǤǯǮǯ 
experts to engineer rehabilitation or deterrence, a story is told of increasing 
distrust of government and its experts, resulting in increasing demands that 
attention should be paid to popular sentiments in favour of harsh punishment.4 
These demands gain in toxicity because they are made, and satisfied, through the ǡǮǡǯ
playing to a perceived gallery of popular retributive sentiment. Interesting 
questions arise as to why it should be particularly the Anglo-American countries 
to which this has happened. Depending on the diagnosis, solving the problem 
might require recognising, working with, or changing structural socio-economic 
                                                        
3 Cf. Corey Brettschneider, Democratic Rights: The Substance of Self-Government. 
4 See e.g. the papers in D. Garland (ed.), Mass Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences 
(London: Sage, 2001); ǤǡǮ Fall of the Platonic Guardians,ǯ British Journal of Criminology 
vol. 46 (2006). 
conditions of the countries worst affected.5 But at least part of the solution, 
according to this story, involves greater insulation of criminal justice decisions 
from the pressure of public opinion Ȃ greater discretion of experts to base 
decision on genuinely relevant considerations rather than having to conform to 
the electoral gambits of their political masters. Thus for instance, Nicola Lacey 
has proposed, in the UK, a Royal Commission modelled on the Monetary Policy 
Committee established by Gordon Brown to depoliticise key decisions regarding 
economic policy.6 
 
Against this conclusion, the line of thought I am interested in argues instead that 
it is greater, not less, democracy in the criminal justice system that we should be 
pursuing.7 The plausibility of this argument depends, firstly, on the particular 
understanding of democracy that is in play; and secondly, on what we can 
reasonably expect from democratic processes.  
 
Albert Dzur argues for this position in his recent book, Punishment, Participatory 
Democracy and the Jury.8 ǡǯument is, not just that 
criminal justice policies should be made in line with some understanding of Ǯǡǯ for 
making key decisions within the criminal justice system. Thus Dzur distinguishes ǮǡǯǮǯǮ-ǯȋǤ ? ? ?Ȍǣ
first is simply the idea that the public can vote on various options, the results of 
which are then implemented by a technical association; the second, that experts 
within institutions should lobby and advocate in favour of views for which there 
is significant public support (cf. ǮǯǤ ? ?Ȍ; 
while the third, which Dzur favours, involves active participation by citizens in 
making key decisions. The central ǡǯǡ
is the jury. He argues that load-bearing lay participation in the criminal justice 
system has advantages over the model of institutional decision-making by 
experts favoured by Lacey. 
 
There are various initial reasons for thinking that load-bearing democracy, 
exemplified in the jury, is worth considering as a candidate solution to the 
problems of contemporary penality. The jury is, or can be, a deliberative forum, 
in which citizens exercise their intelligence to come to a decision, and debate 
alternative solutions, thus broaching, and learning to deal with, fundamental 
value disagreements that may characterise their wider society.9 Its membership 
is, or can be made to be, inclusive and representative of the population as a 
whole. It is an institution that by and large (with the exception of cases of 
                                                        
5 N. Lacey, ǯ: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary 
Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). ǤǡǮǡǯRatio Juris vol. 17 (2004).  
6 Lacey, pp. 191-2. 
7 Though note that Lacey claims that her proposal will enrich rather than dilute democracy (p. 
196). 
8 A. Dzur, Punishment, Participatory Democracy and the Jury (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012). Page references in the text are to this book. 
9 Ǥ
ǤǡǮǣǡǫǡǯ
Punishment and Society vol. 2 (2000). 
nullification) takes its place within an institutional framework recognised as 
constraining or binding it, rather than exercising unfettered autonomy in its 
decisions. Lastly, in part as a result of the previous point, its members by and 
large have to collaborate with experts rather than overriding or ignoring them.  
 ǯǡ
distinctive and attractive contribution to the debate. One of the central 
objections to democracy, and the question an aspect of which I wish to pursue 
later in the essay, has always been the thought that it involves handing over the 
reins of government to the ignorant,10 and that democratic decision-making 
would never be able to learn from past experience unless the populace as a 
whole could somehow be brought to understand the complex technical issues. ǯǡdoes not doubt the authority of public 
opinion but rather takes it that electoral politics distorts public opinion and 
hence delivers a criminal justice policy that the public does not want: ǮǤǤǤǤǤǤǯ11 But she takes it that a commission of expert 
advisors would better bring policy into line with considered public opinion and 
hence retains what is attractive in democracy. ǯis rather that 
laypeople should be given a central role in helping institutions to do their jobs. 
This allows him to acknowledge the crucial role of institutions as repositiories of 
knowledge that can be laid down in procedures and systems rather than remade 
afresh by each generation of individual role-occupiers. It also allows that 
laypeople can and should accept guidance from those with technical knowledge. 
Further, it allows that giving real decision-making power to citizens might be 
compatible with (or even necessary for), rather than in conflict with, rule of law 
values such as publicity, transparency and predictability. But the question 
between Dzur and Lacey concerns what is of value in public participation: Dzur 
must be able to point to something important that would be lost if we took ǯǡǤ  
 
I will suggest that he defends two different theses in response to this question: 
the Correction Thesis, and the Common Ownership Thesis. We will look at how 
one might argue for these two theses. I will then look at an example that puts 
pressure on the Correction Thesis, raising the question whether there is really an 
important role left for lay participation if so much is conceded to institutions and 
expert decision-making. By way of conclusion I will argue that greater 
consideration needs to be paid to the Common Ownership Thesis. 
 
3. Two ways to argue for greater lay participation in criminal justice 
First of all, then, what considerations does Dzur think speak in favour of load-
bearing participatory democracy in criminal justice? Here is a key passage: 
 Ǯ
that lay participation improves institutions because citizens can help 
                                                        
10 Ǥǯǯ
at Theory of Justice, pp. 232-3. 
11 Lacey, p. 185. Cf. also pp. 179-181. 
produce better decisions than professionals working alone and with the 
position that participation enhances the legitimacy of institutions by 
expanding the base of actually consenting citizens. I wish to stress as a 
matter of priority a different line of thought, however, which seems more 
fundamental because it is required by the other ideas: Lay participation in 
criminal justice is needed because it brings otherwise attenuated people 
into contact with suffering human beings, draws attention to the ways 
laws and policies and institutional structures prolong that suffering, and 
makes possible Ȃ though does not guarantee Ȃ greater awareness among 
participants of their own responsibility for laws and policies and 
structures that treat people humanely. I see this as an argument about 
responsibility and admit that responsibility is not the same thing as 
legitimacy, proportionality, or other substantive goals we also wish to see ǤǯȋǤ ? ?Ȍ 
 
In this passage and elsewhere in the book, Dzur recognises as important but 
ultimately auxiliary considerations two influential aspects of lay engagement in 
institutions of government. First of all, that engagement in institutions can make 
citizens better educated, in this case about criminal justice issues, and that this 
can have a positive effect in making their demands on those institutions more ȋǮǯȌ.12 And secondly, that citizen engagement in institutions 
makes those institutions, and their role in the government of the people more 
legitimate through democratic authorisation or consent. These are normative 
features that Dzur can happily acknowledge, but he does not treat them as the 
core of his case. 
 
How are we to understand the central point that Dzur makes in this passage, the 
claim he describes as his core normative argument? Although he denies that this 
is his main argument, it looks as though one reasonable way to interpret what 
Dzur is after is that citizen engagement in institutions results in better decisions 
being made than professionals working alone. This is despite the fact that lay 
involvement may be less efficient, and may lead to disregard for proper 
procedure (p. 55). Lay participation is necessary to overcome what immediately ǮǳǡǳǯȋǤ ? ?ȌǤ 
 
This suggests that ǯcore claim is what we might call the 
Correction Thesis. This is the idea that lay participation is not inherently 
antagonistic to institutions and expert decision-making, but is rather required in 
order to complete decision-making ǯ
proper function. It is the Correction Thesis because the idea is that lay 
participation is necessary to correct for certain limitations and biases inherent 
even in the best decision-making that is carried out by people in possession of 
superior knowledge of an issue when they make those decisions by virtue of 
their occupying institutional roles.  
 
                                                        
12 ǤǡǮǤǯ 
I think we can identify three main grounds for the Correction Thesis, all of which 
Dzur alludes to at some point in the book. One of these grounds has to do with 
the subject-matter of the decisions to be made, which involve substantive moral 
balances and trade-offs between one desirable value and another. It might be 
said that institutions have no special expertise in the question of how this trade-
offs should be made (ǮEthical Pluralismǯ). A 
second has to do with the fact that institutional role-occupiers must operate 
according to procedures that delineate narrow grounds of relevance and 
responsibility, and will often fail to give officials discretion to take into account 
all relevant considerations. Officials follow rules laid down by authoritative 
characterisations of their official responsibilities, and often have little discretion 
to use their own judgement without violating their terms of office. The result of 
this is that decisions made according to institutional procedure will often not be 
as accurate with regard to  as freely responsive, individualised assessment of 
cases (ǮLimitations of Institutional Procedureǯ).13 The third has to 
do with the psychological effects of institutionalisation on decision-makers, 
whereby they become hardened to the realities of the cases they deal with, 
treating them as routine, and fall prey to biases of protecting the institution as 
opposed to giving proper attention to the interests of those the institution serves 
(ǮMoral CalcificationǯǣǮǡǡ
relationships between insiders that trump close consideration of the needs of ǡǥǯȋǤ
102)).  
 
The Correction Thesis thus builds on some claims about the limitations and 
problems of institutions, claims that deserve further discussion, but which I hope 
it is helpful to set out here. I think that in some respects ǯ
defence of lay participation, and it is crucial for his claim that democracy could 
solve rather than exacerbating the problem of penal populism.  
 
However, the Correction Thesis does not capture what, in the passage quoted 
earlier, Dzur describes as his main concern, namely responsibility. Thus at times 
there is evidence of a different line of thought, a line of thought that I will term 
the Common Ownership Thesis. This is evidenced in the exhortation that lay 
participation is needed because we need to face up to our responsibilities (for 
instance in the discussion of Zygmunt BaumanǯǡǤǤǤ ? ?ȌǤThe Common 
Ownership thesis stresses our mutual responsibility, and the idea that the 
problems which the criminal justice system seeks to address, and the problems it 
creates and confronts as it pursues its goals, are our problems, issues that we 
have to take responsibility for, as a collective. The idea of common ownership of 
these problems stems from the idea that, as members of the democratic project, 
as people who have taken on the responsibilities of self-government, we are 
responsible for one another in certain respects: one aspect of which is that we 
have relinquished the possibility that someone else will take care of our 
                                                        
13 For a discussion of the tensions between institutional understandings of role-
responsibilities and their moral bases, see K. Brownlee, Conscience and 
Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), pp. 88-103. 
responsibilities towards one another for us. We have to look after these 
responsibilities ourselves. Furthermore Ȃ and this is the crucial point that links 
the Common Ownership Thesis to the substantial view of the responsibilities of 
self-government that I mentioned in the Introduction Ȃ these are responsibilities 
that we cannot simply devolve to a technical association or bureaucracy to sort 
out for us. They are problems that we have to sort out for ourselves.  
 
The Common Ownership Thesis as I have presented it raises some questions. For 
instance, as I have presented it, the Common Ownership Thesis is a conditional 
thesis: it says that if we have decided to go for self-government then we take on a 
responsibility for one another, since no one else is any longer being given the Ǥǯ
responsibilities of self-government in the first place. Why not just leave it to 
some benevolent bureaucracy? Another question concerns why it is necessary to 
become involved ourselves in helping to run the institutions of our society. In 
other words, as so far stated, the Common Ownership Thesis does not address 
the intuition that mutual responsibility might be the reason we have for adopting 
self-government in the first place, and in particular that it might be the reason 
for thinking that self-government has to involve actual load-bearing 
participation. That is a suggestive thought Ȃ perhaps the idea might be that the 
importance of our responsibility for one another is so great that we have to get 
involved in the running of the institutions by which people in our society are or 
are not cared for in order to ensure that the task is carried out well enough Ȃ that 
it is never good enough to leave it to others. Although suggestive, though, this 
thought is as yet unclear. Firstly, it is not entirely clear how to argue for our 
mutual responsibility in this sense. Secondly, a problem arises because it is not 
enough to appeal to our responsibility for one another qua fellow human beings: 
the institutions of a state are fundamentally geared towards serving those living 
within a certain jurisdiction; those outside it need not be ignored, but the 
interests of those within will almost certainly be privileged. So the question 
arises why we are responsible in particular for that group of people. Thirdly, it 
would have to be explained how this strong notion that we ought to take 
responsibility for one another in such a way as to rule out our devolving ǯ could be made compatible with a division of 
labour.  
 
4. A closer look at the Correction Thesis 
There are problems with the Common Ownership Thesis. But I set them out here 
mainly because I think more work needs to be done to explain how they are to be 
overcome: I do think that there is something plausible about this thesis. 
However, I think that, once the Common Ownership Thesis is fully made out, the 
dialectical situation is probably going to turn out to be something like the 
following. In running an argument for participatory democracy, the Common 
Ownership Thesis, properly explained and defended, is the core argument. But 
the Common Ownership Thesis is likely to meet the criticism that democratic 
decision-making will lead to bad decisions. At this point, the Correction Thesis 
steps in to head off that criticism. This means that the Correction Thesis is not 
doing the main work in justifying the claims of participatory democracy.  
 
One benefit of seeing the structure of the argument in these terms is that it 
means that the Correction Thesis is not left bearing more weight than it is 
capable of bearing. What I mean by this is that, while the Correction Thesis 
seems to me to have some plausibility, I am not clear how far it can be 
generalised. We might have to accept that it can be true in some cases, but not 
others Ȃ and I will explore this thought below. On the understanding of the 
argument that I propose, however, it might be enough that the Correction Thesis 
holds in at least some cases, because the main justification is given by whatever 
considerations lie behind a fully defended form of the Common Ownership 
Thesis. The idea would be that lay participation may fail to correct for biased 
institutional decision-making in at least some, and perhaps a considerable 
number of cases, but that this will fail to show that lay participation is 
unnecessary because sub-optimal decision-making in some cases may be a price 
worth paying for the good of taking direct responsibility for one another: it may 
be plausible, in other words, that the attitudes of care shown by direct lay 
participation in institutional decision-making compensate for the fact that the 
decisions are not always the best that they could be. 
 
Having set the stall out in this way, let us now turn to an example of the sort that 
puts pressure on the Correction Thesis. Consider for instance a panel assembled 
to divide out government money for community groups. Various community 
groups apply to the panel for funding, and the panel decides which projects 
should be successful. The panel is made up of lay members Ȃ something like the 
jury as Dzur conceives of it, though not operating in the criminal justice arena.  
 
I think this example is reasonably realistic, and the kind of thing that currently 
happens under the banner of localism Ȃ perhaps because this might be precisely 
the kind of area where politicians or policy-makers can agree that the public can 
safely be involved. Even in this case, however, there are serious impacts to be 
made on the communities in question. However, the use of lay members in a 
panel like this can draw the criticism Ȃ not just from cynical observers, but from 
those who care that money goes to those groups who most need and deserve it Ȃ 
that it is either tokenistic or downright counter-productive. I want to try to draw 
out some of the reasons for that kind of criticism by turning to the points we 
briefly made above in defence of the Correction Thesis.  
 
One reason for allowing public load-bearing participation in a panel like this 
might be Ethical Pluralism: maybe there are various relevant criteria of 
assessment when it comes to deciding which group should get funding, and it is 
an open, contestable question how those are to be ranked. Even allowing for 
pluralism, however, there really are important and relevant criteria of 
assessment that any adequate decision would have to pay attention to. It can be 
common for lay participants in these kinds of decisions to feel at sea in trying to 
judge which organisation should get the money. They can be quite simply 
ignorant of the relevant criteria of assessment. This problem could be alleviated 
by ǯrts are there for collaboration. Thus perhaps 
we could improve our pǯ-making by stipulating that the panel 
should be given a briefing by officials before they start their deliberations. Fine Ȃ 
but how far can briefing go? One problem is that decision-makers have to know, 
not just what the relevant criteria of assessment are, but how to apply them. For 
instance, in this case, it might be relevant whether the organisation or project to 
be funded is financially viable Ȃ whether it is likely to be a flash in the pan, or 
whether it is likely to secure ongoing funding; whether it serves some important 
social need and is well-conceived in terms of meeting that need. Decision-makers 
need to know what these criteria involve in actual cases, so as to be able to 
assess whether some candidate organisation meets the criteria better than 
another. It requires expertise to understand this. So does the briefing of lay 
participants extend to something as substantive as this?  
 
This leads to a tension. Without substantial briefing, lay decision-making will be 
arbitrary. WhaǮational disorganisationǯ
participation will be, not just a humanising strike against hyper-efficiency, but a 
failure to make decisions of a quality that those subject to those decisions have a 
right to expect. It will be, ǯǮǯǤBut 
where we try to solve this problem by introducing substantial briefing by 
officials, there is the worry that the lay decision-making is mere window-
dressing, effectively determined in advance by the way in which the officials 
present the information. 
 
I have focused on the grounding of the Correction Thesis in Ethical Pluralism. 
Can the Correction Thesis be rescued by appealing instead to the grounds that I 
have called Limitations of Institutional Procedure or Moral Calcification? With 
respect to both of these arguments, it might seem that the best we can say is Ȃ it 
depends. Sometimes institutions are dysfunctional, procedure-bound, and 
blinker their officials rather than training them in relevant virtues. But perhaps 
not always.14 Sometimes even good people become corrupted by institutions and 
come to care more for their own advancement, or the survival of the institution Ȃ 
the closing of ranks in the face of justified criticism Ȃ than the interests of those 
the institution is meant to serve; but perhaps not always. The Correction Thesis 
as Dzur presents it seems to be a general claim about institutions, and the 
introduction of lay participation not just a solution to specific problems of failing, 
corrupt or dysfunctional institutions but a general prescription for how the 
institutions could work better. 
 
My suggestion is that the Correction Thesis can only do so much work. But I have 
also suggested that perhaps it has to be recognised that something like the 
Common Ownership Thesis is the core normative claim, and that the Common 
Ownership Thesis, though it needs more defence, is a plausible one. So it might 
be worth very briefly thinking through whether it is plausible that lay 
participation in the kind of decision-making panel we have just been thinking 
about could be justified in the terms given by the Common Ownership Thesis. 
The key claim here would translate into the idea that the problem of deciding 
how to distribute the limited funding that is available for the community groups 
in question is a collective problem, and that it is not enough to simply leave it to 
a professional body to make the decision for us. Now there is at least part of this 
                                                        
14 Cf. the remarks about the relation between institutions and virtues in A. 
MAcIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985), p. 194. 
thought that I find compelling. There is some bite to the idea that simply having 
the professionals make the decision Ȃ however well-qualified those professionals 
are Ȃ is a way of passing the buck and not facing up to the fact that it is up to us 
(collectively) to make the decisions. It might thus be, in Dǯǡ
of concern for others. In which case, it might indeed be more responsible of us to ǮǯȂ the demos Ȃ rather than 
allowing the decision to be made for us by officials. The fact that sometimes sub-
optimal decisions will be made in this way might well be compensated for by the 
fact that, in making these decisions, we are facing up to the normative situation, 
and treating our responsibilities to those subject to the decisions with due 
concern. Nevertheless, the plausibility of this view rests on the idea that the Ǯǯǡ
responsibility that would be evaded if we let the decision be made for us. It 
seems to me that, to advance the kind of position that Dzur wants to argue for 
requires addressing the basis of that responsibility. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper I have looked at some arguments for introducing a greater degree 
of lay participation into decision-making in the criminal justice system and other Ǥǯ
version of this position, and the question whether we can find in his work an 
account of why load-bearing public participation in criminal justice institutions 
is a better model than e.g. the insulated expert Policy Committee model 
suggested by Lacey. I have argued that we can distinguish two types of argument 
for the conclusion that we should introduce greater lay participation: the 
Correction Thesis; and the Common Ownership Thesis. I claimed that the 
Correction Thesis is inadequate to provide a general justification for greater lay 
participation. Such a general justification might more plausibly be given by the 
Common Ownership thesis. But the latter needs some work done on it before we 
can fully understand its scope and plausibility.  
 
 
 
 
